I use the recent financial crisis and utilize the predetermined variations in stock repurchase program ending dates to show that open market share repurchase programs are not as flexible as one might expect. My difference-in-difference estimator shows that once firms have announced such programs, they sacrifice real activities to finish them. Specifically, firms with open market share repurchase programs ending after December 2007 cut 1.9 percentage points more of capital investment, four employees more per million dollars of capital stock, and 9 percentage points more of R&D expense to fund the share repurchases than otherwise similar firms with programs ending before December 2007. The reductions represent a 7%-15% decrease of pre-crisis levels. The freed-up capital indeed goes toward the share repurchase programs: firms buyback on average 84% of the predetermined amount of the shares.
I. Introduction
Share repurchase programs are playing an increasingly important role in firms' payout polices. In 1995, only 15% of publicly listed firms in the United States repurchased shares. This number increased to 45% by 2012. Meanwhile, the dollar amount of total share repurchases among publicly listed U.S. firms increased from $90 billion of real 2012 dollars in 1995 to $364 billion in 2012 (Farre-Mensa et al., 2014) . Share repurchases have become the dominant form of corporate payout (Skinner, 2008; Floyd et al., 2015) . Open market share repurchase programs represent more than 90% of all the share repurchase programs announced (Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; Grullon and Michaely, 2004) . Brav et al. (2005) survey 384 managers about their payout decisions. The managers report that they prefer open market share repurchases because share repurchase programs provide managers with great flexibility in the amount and timing of stock buybacks.
Specifically, the managers can decide how many shares or the dollar amount to buyback at announcement. Meanwhile, they have the option to time the market and only buyback when the market conditions are favorable (Dittmar and Field, 2015) . Additionally, the managers do not have to repurchase all the shares or the dollar amount announced. They can let the repurchase programs expire or retire them instead.
However, is this really the case in practice? Specifically, are the managers simply going to stop buying back their shares when facing financing difficulties that prevent them from doing so? In this paper, I would like to ask: given the flexibility of share repurchase programs, do managers cut their share repurchases to fund other firm activities? Or do the managers sacrifice firms' real activities to complete their share repurchase programs?
To unveil the true relation between firms' completion of open market share repurchase programs and financial policies is difficult due to endogeneity concerns. During normal times, the relation is predetermined and everything is anticipated. An ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of real outcome variables on share repurchase completion is subject to omitted variable bias. In this paper, I consider open market share repurchase programs as contracts that are announced well ahead of time. I exploit the predetermined variations in open market share repurchase program ending dates surrounding the 2007 financial crisis to overcome the empirical difficulties. When firms announce their open market share repurchase programs, they also announce the ending dates of these programs.
At announcement, it is difficult for the firms to anticipate the upcoming financial crisis.
As a result, they were not able to strategically plan the optimum ending dates of their open market share repurchase programs to protect themselves against the downturn. My identifying assumption is that having repurchase programs with ending dates after the recent financial crisis is uncorrelated with firms' response to the crisis through channels other than share repurchases. I first identify a sample of firms who announced open market share repurchase programs before the recent financial crisis with ending dates after it (the treatment group). The control firms are those who announced open market share repurchase programs before the recent financial crisis whose programs also end before it.
Using a difference-in-difference approach, I find that firms sacrifice real activities to a great extent to fund their open market share repurchase programs. My difference-indifference point estimates show that treatment group firms cut 1.9 and 9 percentage points more in capital investment and R&D expense, respectively, and layoff four more employees per million dollars of capital stock than control firms. These results are economically large.
The cutbacks represent around 7% in capital investment, 6.9% in employment, and 15.4% in R&D expense of the pre-crisis level. In addition, I find that the firms in the treatment group complete their open market share repurchase programs at a very high rate, on average about 84%. The evidence confirms that the reductions from real activities are diverted to complete share repurchases. In conclusion, these results indicate that open market share repurchase programs are not as flexible as one might think. Once firms announce these programs, they will complete them, even at a cost.
One alternative explanation of the results is that firms have already completed the majority of their open market share repurchase programs before December 2007. If this is the case, all the treatment group would only have a small portion of share repurchases left. As a result, the decrease in real activities is not a consequence of share repurchase programs, rather some other factors affecting firms' decisions. To mitigate this concern, I hand-collected the share repurchase program status of all the treatment group around December 2007 from the closest 10-K or 10-Q filings. I find that the treatment group on average repurchased less than 35% of the predetermined amount, in terms of both dollar value and numbers of shares. The above findings indicate that firms are on track with their share repurchases and it is not trivial to finish buying the rest.
The most common concern with a difference-in-difference study is that the pretreatment parallel trends between the treatment and control groups need to be satisfied.
Having open market share repurchase programs ending after the recent financial crisis must be the only factor driving the reductions in real activities for my arguments to be valid. Further, I want to make sure that treatment and control firms have similar share repurchase program durations. For example, if one firm always announces repurchase programs with six-month durations and another firm always announces repurchase programs lasting two years, they might be fundamentally different. Another concern is that there might be a latent macro-level variable that is driving the sharp treatmentcontrol contrast in the post-treatment period.
I address these concerns in several ways. First, I match a firm in the treatment group with a firm in the control group that has a similar duration. Second, I show that the outcome variables for the treatment and control groups have no difference in pre-exsiting trends. Meanwhile, I control for a battery of firm characteristics along with firm fixed effects, year fixed effects, and industry times year fixed effects. Specifically, instead of matching on duration, I add controls for share repurchase duration up to the 4th order polynomial to address the linearity assumption and interact all the control variables with the treated dummy to eliminate all possible differences between the treatment and control groups. I find qualitatively similar results.
Next, I split the sample based on whether the firms have long-term financial analyst forecast coverage. Analysts allocate their efforts to firms with good future prospects (McNichols and O'Brien, 1997) . Firms with more analyst coverage get more attention from investors, hence realize lower capital costs (Merton, 1987) . My results show that firms without long-term analyst forecast coverage cut back real activities significantly.
Based on aforementioned theory by McNichols and O'Brien (1997) and Merton (1987) , firms that scale back investment are those with an uncertain future and facing higher costs. They are better off using the funds to support their core activities. However, I find that the funds are diverted to share repurchases. This result provides further support that share repurchases are not flexible, even the firms in most need of resources are trying to complete them. As these firms announce their repurchases so close to the recent financial crisis, they may have believed they were more resistant to financial downturns (Ouimet and Simintzi, 2015) . I find these firms faced more severe cuts to real activities in magnitude as compared to the full sample, which includes all three years before the recent financial crisis.
To get a more complete picture about share repurchase flexibility, I examine whether the cutback on real activities spillover to operating activities. I look at the profit margin and sales growth to get an idea of operating performance changes between the treatment and control groups. I find that the treatment group experiences 1 percentage point lower profit margin than the control group. That's equivalent to a 6% decrease in pre-crisis level profit margin. I also find the treatment group had a 2.8 percentage point lower sales growth rate than the control firms. This paper contributes to the extensive literature on share repurchases that focus on their (in)flexibility and completion. Many papers document the reasons why firms buyback their stocks, such as stock price undervaluation (Ikenberry et al., 1995; Brockman and Chung, 2001; Peyer and Vermaelen, 2009) , to mitigate agency problems by returning excess cash to investors (Dittmar, 2000) , employee stock option exercise anti-dilution (Kahle, 2002) , and managers think share repurchase programs are the best investments as compared to other investment opportunities (Grullon and Michaely, 2004) .
1 However, fewer researchers examine the completion of open market share repurchase programs.
Papers mainly focus on the reasons why firms complete their share repurchases. For example, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that firms increase their share repurchases when the degree of perceived undervaluation is lower. Oded (2009) models the free cash flow and adverse selection problems in share repurchase decisions and finds that the wider the bid-ask spread, the lower the share repurchase completion rate. Chemmanur and Li (2014) finds that institutional trading immediately after an open market repurchase announcement has significant predictive power for the actual purchases by the firm. Bonaimé (2012) documents that a firm's reputation from prior repurchase activities is a determinant of the current repurchase completion rate. Firms have higher announcement returns of new share repurchase programs given they completed their prior programs. In this paper, I examine the real and operational consequences of completing share repurchase programs as this has yet to be reported in the literature. in Section VI.
II. Empirical Design
I start this section with institutional background on open market share repurchase programs and discuss the identification strategy. I then describe the data and the construction of the variables. I also present the summary statistics.
A. Open Market Share Repurchase Programs
Open market share repurchase programs are becoming increasingly popular among U.S.
firms. By 2013, over 40% of U.S. publicly traded firms had initiated open market share repurchase programs, more than threefold the 1995 figure (Skinner, 2008 
B. The 2007 financial crisis
The recent financial crisis is widely regarded as a supply shock in the academic literature.
During this period, firms had a hard time accessing external financing. Almeida et al.
(2012) document a dramatic credit spread increase for both short-and long-term credit instruments. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) find that bank lending falls in all types of loans. Gorton (2009) theoretically models that banks are flying to quality, which leads to the increased cost of all forms of external capital (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008 Consequently, the firms in my sample would start to experience the recession as the economy entered a trough.
C. Identification Strategy
In the spirit of Almeida et al. (2012) and Ouimet and Simintzi (2015) , I treat share repurchase programs as contracts that are negotiated and signed ahead of time. Similar to firms' debt maturities that are predetermined with a specific due date as in Almeida et al. (2012) and the labor contracts that are signed at random times but require renewal at a specific future date as in Ouimet and Simintzi (2015) , open market share repurchase programs are announced ahead of time with predetermined program ending dates. At the announcements, it was difficult for the managers to correctly predict that the economy will peak in December 2007 and then begin to decline. Therefore, the managers were not able to strategically set the ending dates of their open market share repurchase programs ex ante. I assume that repurchase programs that end after the crisis are uncorrelated One potential drawback is that this matching process reduces the sample size. To fully utilize my control sample and to address some concerns about matching on duration, I
use the full control group in the robustness test. 7 Specifically, I include durations up to 7 I present this result in Table 13 . Lastly, the control group could be somewhat special since they just happen to finish their repurchases before December 2007. Their managers might have some superior 8 I find that as of December 2007, on average 355 days had elapsed for the repurchase programs of the treated firms. These programs had an average duration of 1,300 days, so roughly speaking, the firms were about a quarter way through the share repurchase programs as of December 2007. Meanwhile approximately two-thirds of the shares (dollar amount) remained unrepurchased. The evidence above shows that the treatment group was on track with their share repurchases instead of being anomalies in the market. skills to predict the financial crisis. Skinner (2008) 
D. Sample Selection
The data used in this paper come from two main sources. I use the Securities Data 
E. Construction of Variables and Summary Statistics
The main outcome variables are capital investment, employment, and R&D expense.
Capital investment is defined as capital expenditures scaled by lagged total capital stock (capx/ppent).
9 Employment is defined as the number of employees per million dollars of lagged capital stock (emp×1000/ppent). R&D expense is defined as the total research and development expense scaled by lagged total capital stock (xrd/ppent). Following Almeida et al. (2004) and Rauh (2006) , I include size, Tobin's Q, leverage, cash holdings, and cash flow as control variables. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (log(at)).
Tobin's Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the book value of assets. Leverage is the sum of short-term debt (dlc) and long-term debt (dltt). Cash is cash and short-term investments (che). Cash flow is the sum of income before extraordinary items (ib) and depreciation and amortization (dp). To alleviate endogeneity concerns, I measure all of the control variables prior to the treatment period. All the variables are deflated and scaled accordingly. I winsorize all the variables at the 1% level to reduce the effect of outliers.
[Place Table 1 
III. Are Repurchases Really Flexible
In my analysis, I use a difference-in-difference estimation approach. Specifically, I estimate regressions of the following form:
In equation (1), i, j, and t index firm, industry, and year. post it = 1 if firm i is in years 2009-2011. treated it = 1 if firm i is in the periods when treatment occurs. X it is a set of time-varying firm-level control variables discussed above. λ i is firm fixed effects, τ t is year fixed effects, α j × τ t is industry-year fixed effects, and it is the error term. β 1 , the coefficient of the interaction term, is the focus of the analysis.
[Place Table 2 about here]
To properly implement a difference-in-difference estimation, I have to make sure that the outcome variables of the treatment and control groups follow parallel trends during the periods leading up to the 2007 financial crisis. In Table 2 , I present the results. As one can see, the treatment and control groups are statistically similar.
[Place Table 3 about here] and R&D expense, respectively, to rule out the common factors driving corporate policies.
The results remain qualitatively the same as the baseline results. I then add industry times year fixed effects to control for industry-specific environment changes (columns 3, 6, and 9). I find that firms with repurchase programs ending after December 2007 on average cut their investment-to-capital ratio by 1.9 percentage points more than similar firms with share repurchase programs ending before December 2007. Similarly, the treatment group on average terminates four more employees per million dollars of capital stock than the control group while the treatment group on average decreases their R&D expense-tocapital ratio by 9 percentage points more than the control group. In economic terms, these results convey that the 1.9 percentage point decrease in capital investments represents a 7% drop in pre-crisis capital investment levels, the reduction of four employees per million dollars of capital stock represents a drop of 6.9% in pre-crisis employment levels, [Place [Place Table 5 about here]
For comparative purposes, I report the share repurchase completion rates from a few studies in Table 5 . Stephens and Weisbach (1998) back out share repurchase completion rate from dollars spent on repurchases divided by average share price. They find that firms buyback around 82% of the announced shares. Oded (2009) and Bonaimé (2012) use the same SDC data as I do but examine difference sample periods. They find firms complete 92% and 73% of the announced programs, respectively. In a more recent study, and Floyd et al. (2015) , in which they both report a reduction in share repurchase announcements during the recent financial crisis. The popular press has also widely reported the decrease in share repurchase initiations, with a historical low in 2009.
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In summary, I show that open market share repurchase programs are not as flexible as they appear. Firms still have the ability to not announce them. However, once they announce such programs, they will conclude them even if they need to take reductions in real activities.
IV. Additional Results
In this section, I examine a split sample using a long-term analyst forecast coverage A. Long-Term Analyst Coverage McNichols and O'Brien (1997) show that analysts allocate their efforts to firms with good future prospects. Merton (1987) documents that firms with more analyst coverage gets more attention from investors and leads to a lower cost of capital. Jung et al. (2015) find that changes in analyst interest is positively associated with future changes in the fundamentals. One can infer that firms without long-term analyst coverage need more resources at the current stage to maintain normal activities. Since open market share repurchase programs appear to have flexibility, one would not expect to see the firms without long-term analyst coverage to cut real activities to fund the share repurchases.
If such firms indeed cut capital investment, employment, and R&D expense to buyback shares, then share repurchases are not really flexible.
[Place Table 6 about here] I split the sample based on firms' long-term analyst forecast coverage. I obtain financial analyst forecast coverage data from I/B/E/S. I define long-term forecast as forecasting firms' EPS more than three years ahead. I use analyst four-year and five-year forecasts in my test. I code a firm as having long-term coverage if at least one analyst is reporting future EPS on the firm. I report the results in Table 6 . I implement the same regression specification as in equation (1). I report the four-year coverage sample in columns (1) -(6) and the five-year coverage sample in columns (7) -(12). I find that firms without long-term analyst coverage cut back capital investment, employment, and R&D expense. The results are statistically significant. The magnitudes are higher than the full sample I reported in Table 3 , which means the firms in this subsample are cutting back more.
I also tab the data to see if there are any differences in share repurchase completion rates between firms with and without long-term analyst coverage. In unreported results, I find that the completion rates between the two groups are qualitatively similar. [Place Table 7 about here]
I define laterP ost = 1 if firm i is in 2012 and 2013 and interact it with the treatment dummy. I extend the main specifications in Table 3 by adding this interaction term to equation (1).
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I present the results in Table 7 . The coefficients of the main interaction term treat × post are of similar magnitude with the main results and statistically significant. However, the coefficients of the second interaction term laterP ost×treated are all positive, which means share repurchases do not impose negative 12 The results are available upon request. 13 Specifically, I estimate
long-term consequences. Firms escalate investment activities after the financial crisis. The coefficients are statistically significant for capital investment but not for employment and R&D expense.
One possible explanation is that firms delayed their investments to after the financial crisis when there were better investment opportunities. Another possible explanation is that the wedge in investment between the treatment and control groups became smaller.
Recall that the later period is year 2012 and 2013, so this might be due to the fact that the treatment group got better access to external financing when the economy began to recover. Ouimet and Simintzi (2015) , I can mitigate the concerns about firms intentionally choose to announce share repurchases before a financial crisis because they think they can better manage potential downturns.
C. Recently Announced Repurchase Programs
[Place Table 8 about here] I present the findings in Table 8 . I conduct regressions using the same nine specifications as for Table 3 . I report capital investment as the outcome variable in columns (1) -(3), employment as the outcome variable in columns (4) -(6), and R&D expense as the outcome variable in columns (7) -(9). I find similar results to Table 3 .
However, the magnitudes of the difference-in-difference point estimates are higher for this sample under all three outcome variables. Specifically, the effects on capital investment, employment, and R&D expense are 27%, 50%, and 20% larger than the full sample. Firms that announce repurchase programs in 2006 and 2007 took much deeper cuts to their real activities, meaning that the firms cannot really time financial crises. This result indirectly shows that the recent financial crisis is a surprise to the firms because the firms announced their programs so close to the crisis realized bigger scale-backs on average.
D. Operating Outcomes
The discussion above focuses on firms' real activities. It is natural to ask whether firms with open market share repurchase programs ending after December 2007 have better or worse operating performance than similar firms with programs ending before. I examine two measures of operating outcome: profit margin and sales growth. Since anything related to firms' assets and equity is contaminated in the setting, I focus on sales-related variables.
I define profit margin as operating income divided by lagged sales. I calculate sales growth as the ratio of the difference between firms' sales in year t and year t − 1 to firms' sales in year t − 1. I implement a similar regression specification as in equation (1) by replacing the outcome variables.
[Place Table 9 about here]
The results are reported in Table 9 . Columns (1) -(3) report the profit margin results. 
A. Matching Estimator
There may be other subtle firm heterogeneities producing the results. I alleviate this concern using a difference-in-difference matching estimator approach (Abadie and Imbens, 2006 ) by following Almeida et al. (2012) and Bliss et al. (2015) . This approach accounts for both observable firm characteristics and unobservables. Specifically, I require firms in the treatment and control groups to be similar in firm size, Tobin's Q, leverage, cash flow, cash holdings, duration of repurchase programs, and industry. Tests between the matched treatment and control groups reveal no statistical difference between them.
[Place Table 10 about here] I report the results in Table 10 . Panel A shows the summary statistics of the matching procedure. The p-value of the t-test statistic between the treatment and control groups reveals no significant difference between them on any of the dimensions I matched upon.
This finding confirms that the matching was successful. I show the matching estimator coefficients, along with the regression results from Table 3 
B. Placebo Tests
The identification strategy relies on the assumption that the treatment and control groups [Place Table 11 about here]
The results from the three placebo periods are shown in Table 11 . Columns (1)- (3) present results from the December 2006 placebo crisis, columns (4)- (6) present results from the December 2005 placebo crisis, and columns (7)- (9) 
C. Dotcom Recession Test
The results have shown a consistent relation between having open market repurchase programs ending after December 2007 and a reduction in investments. However, it is possible that such effects are due to a demand shock or "macro effect" (Almeida et al., 2012) , that is firms might be more likely to cut investments during a recession and this likelihood is higher for firms with open market repurchase programs going into the recession. In order to examine this, I use a period that did not experience a credit supply shock but was a recession. Specifically, I use the 1999-2003 period, known as the dotcom period, during which firms experienced a recession as defined by NBER without external financing shortage.
[Place Table 12 14 If my main findings are due to a recession, I should also see similar effects during the dotcom era. Table 12 shows that coefficients of the interaction term treat×post are not statistically significant. There are no observable differences between the treatment and control groups.
In short, the results are not likely due to the dotcom recession or demand shocks.
D. Full Sample Test
The main tests were conducted on a sample matched on share repurchase durations. I do so to mitigate the issue that firms of different program durations might be fundamentally different. This approach addresses the endogeneity concern but leaves a large portion of available data unused. In this subsection, I utilize the full sample by controlling for share repurchase durations. Specifically, I use the same basic set up as in equation (1).
However, I add controls for share repurchase duration and interactions. In the regression, I control for duration by including up to the fourth order polynomial terms. I also interact all the control variables with the treatment dummy to capture the differences between the treatment and control groups. These additional controls help to deal with issues associated with the difference in time span of the repurchase programs and the different starting and ending dates.
[Place Table 13 about here]
I report the results in Table 13 . In the regressions for the results in columns (3), (7), and (11), I include interactions between the treatment dummy and all other control variables except for duration. In the regressions for the results in columns (4), (8), and (12), I include all the interactions, as well as higher order duration controls. I find qualitatively similar results to those reported in Table 3 .
VI. Concluding Remarks
Open market share repurchase programs are widely regarded as flexible tools in firms' payout policy. The firms can decide not only the timing but also the amount of buybacks.
In They represent a 7%-15% decrease in pre-crisis levels. I show that the freed-up capital indeed goes toward the share repurchase programs -firms buyback on average 84% of the predetermined amount of shares. In additional tests, I find that firms with no long-term analyst coverage cut back more real activities to divert to share repurchases. These results further suggest that repurchases are not flexible since these firms are the ones in most need of capital. I also report that open market share repurchase programs do not impose negative consequences on treatment group firms' longer-term real activities, which might due to firms delaying investments or better overall financing conditions. Treatment group firms also suffer some degree of operational loss, which might be a result of an investment cut. The results are robust to the placebo tests, as well as a battery of other robustness tests.
My paper provides policy implications to firms. Managers have the choice of whether or not to announce share repurchase programs. However, if they ever decide to initiate such programs, they should make sure that they can complete them before doing so (i.e., they have enough resources to complete them or have emergency plans for unexpected events). Otherwise, if there are negative shocks to the firms or the overall economy, the managers cannot easily complete the programs without taking on costly cutbacks.
For future research, it would be helpful to obtain interim data on the exact amount of shares repurchased from the 10-Q and 10-K filings. With the additional data, one can better understand the subtle changes in the relation between firms' financial decisions and share repurchase decisions, hence obtaining deeper knowledge of the issue. This table presents the difference of the change in average capital investment, employment, and R&D expense to capital stock ratio between the treatment and control groups. The base year, year t, is 2008. For example, the first row reports the change from year t − 2 to t − 1. This is the change in the outcome variables from year 2006 to 2007. Column (1) reports the change in capital investment. Column (2) reports the change in employment. Column (3) reports the change in R&D expense. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Outcome Change Capital Investment Employment R&D Expense
t − 2 to t − 1 -0. (1) - (3), I use capital investment (capx/ppent) as the outcome variable in the regression. In columns (4) - (6), I use employment (emp·1000/ppent) as the outcome variable in the regression. And in columns (7) - (9), I use R&D expense (xrd/ppent) as the outcome variable in the regression. The control variables are defined as in Almeida et al. (2004) and Rauh (2006) .
All the variables are winsorized at the 1% level.
The regressions are at the firm-year level. I control for year and firm fixed effects throughout. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Variables
Capital Investment
(8) This table presents the completion rates of share repurchases from a few representative studies in the literature. Column (1) depicts the data source of the respective study.
Column (2) presents the sample periods. And Column (3) presents the completion rates. (1) - (6), I split the sample using four-year analyst coverage and for the results in columns (7) - (12), I splits the sample using five-year analyst coverage. The outcome variables are capital investment, employment, and R&D expense. The control variables are defined as in Almeida et al. (2004) and Rauh (2006) .
Study
The regressions are at the firm-year level. I control for year and firm fixed effects throughout. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(8) I include an additional interaction term treat × laterP ost in the regression in addition to the tests conducted to produce the results in Table 3 . (4) - (6), I use employment (emp·1000/ppent) as the outcome variable in the regression. And in columns (7) - (9), I use R&D expense (xrd/ppent) as the outcome variable in the regression. The control variables are defined as in Almeida et al. (2004) and Rauh (2006) . All the variables are winsorized at the 1% level. The regressions are at the firm-year level. I control for year and firm fixed effects throughout. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Variables
Capital Investment Employment R&D Expense
(8)
Treat × post (4) - (6), I use employment (emp·1000/ppent) as the outcome variable in the regression. And in columns (7) - (9), I use R&D expense (xrd/ppent) as the outcome variable in the regression. The control variables are defined as in Almeida et al. (2004) and Rauh (2006) . All the variables are winsorized at the 1% level. The regressions are at the firm-year level. I control for year and firm fixed effects throughout. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(8) (4) - (6), I use sales growth as the outcome variable. The control variables are defined as in Almeida et al. (2004) and Rauh (2006) . All the variables are winsorized at the 1% level. The regressions are at the firm-year level. I control for year and firm fixed effects throughout. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Profit Margin Sales Growth For each period, the sample is from three years before the placebo crisis to three years after. For consistency reasons, the event year is omitted as a transition year. In columns (1) 
(8) (4) - (6), I use employment (emp·1000/ppent) as the outcome variable in the regression. And in columns (7) -(9), I use R&D expense (xrd/ppent) as the outcome variable in the regression. The control variables are defined as in Almeida et al. (2004) and Rauh (2006) .
Investment Employment R&D Expense
(1)
(8) Table 3 (9) - (12), I use R&D expense (xrd/ppent) as the outcome variable in the regression. The control variables are defined as in Almeida et al. (2004) and Rauh (2006) . All the variables are winsorized at the 1% level. The regressions are at the firm-year level. I control for year and firm fixed effects throughout. Robust standard errors are clustered at the firm level and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
(8) 
